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President Arnoldo Aleman's administration has taken the blame for compounding Nicaragua's
economic troubles with official corruption and the centralization of power (see NotiCen, 2000-08-03).
The latest bad news is that Nicaragua's eligibility for the World Bank's foreign-debt reduction
program may be threatened if Aleman does not privatize the telecommunications company and
attend to the scandal involving the Banco Intercontinental (INTERBANK).
The Superintendencia de Bancos (SIB) took over INTERBANK Aug. 7 after discovering irregularities
in granting US$52 million in loans to Consorcio Nicaraguense Agropecuario (CONAGRA) and its
affiliate Agropecuaria Renacer de San Miguel (AGRESAMI). INTERBANK, founded by Sandinista
investors in 1992, is Nicaragua's second-largest private bank.
National Assembly Deputy Bayardo Arce and other Sandinistas are among the bank's 200
stockholders. Attorney General Julio Centeno Gomez and SIB president Noel Sacasa charged
several bank directors and CONAGRA-AGRESAMI associates Saul and Alex Centeno Roque with
fraud and embezzlement. The irregularities included unsecured loans, checks written without funds,
and the cancellation of unpaid bank debts.
Several loans to CONAGRA-AGRESAMI were made through dummy companies. Banco Central
de Nicaragua (BCN) president Noel Ramirez said that INTERBANK deposits were fully backed by
the BCN and that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) had promised support if needed.
Nevertheless, the news of INTERBANK's insolvency provoked a run on the bank. Economists are
concerned about possible negative effects of SIB's intervention in the bank and the subsequent
political brawl regarding who is to blame for the threat to Nicaragua's financial stability. They
warned that the scandal could scare off foreign investment and could produce a run against other
banks that neither the central bank nor private banks has sufficient reserves to withstand.
The SIB has been criticized for its handling of the bank crisis. Former BCN president Francisco
Lainez said the SIB allowed the problem to develop because it did not do enough to oversee banking
activities. "If the SIB is efficient, these problems should not occur," Lainez said. "The best guarantee
we can have as depositors in a bank is that the SIB watches the banks."
A group of INTERBANK stockholders accused the SIB of acting precipitously by intervening when
it could have used less heavy-handed tactics to stabilize the bank's position. Sandinista leaders
see politics in bank takeover The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) and some
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economists have also said the SIB intervention was unnecessary and accused the administration of
causing the crisis for political reasons.
FSLN secretary general Daniel Ortega charged that the administration was trying to pummel
the party before the November elections. Since INTERBANK was closely associated with the
party, voters would take revenge against the FSLN at the ballot box. Ortega also charged that the
administration was planning to create a crisis in which the SIB would take over another bank in
which Sandinistas were investors the Banco de Finanzas (BDF). Seven other banks besides those
linked to the party should be taken over if the SIB is to do its job, Ortega said.
Arce said the intervention was the result of a fumbled administration drive to get Nicaragua into the
World Bank's Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). He blamed the administration
for endangering Nicaragua's eligibility by actions that threatened the banking system. Long before
the INTERBANK failure occurred, Arce said, the FSLN had warned that the central bank was trying
to artificially inflate its reserves to meet IMF requirements by forcing the banks to buy centralbank bonds. In Arce's reconstruction of events, the BCN's forced sale of bonds drained cash from
INTERBANK so that it could no longer meet its obligations.
Whatever INTERBANK's failures, Arce and other stockholders argue that the intervention caused
the bank's failure and not the other way around. The ensuing panic among depositors brought
suspicion on the entire banking system. Pedro Solorzano, Partido Conservador (PC) candidate
for mayor of Managua in the November elections, found an explanation that would tarnish both
the administration and the FSLN. He said that former Army chief Gen. Humberto Ortega helped
CONAGRA-AGRESAMI get INTERBANK credits to buy up coffee for export. The scandal was part
of the political struggles between the governing Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and the
FSLN, he said.
Solorzano said the bank intervention was retaliation against the Sandinistas for recent ruptures in
the PLC-FSLN political pact. But Aleman denied any political motive, and Gen. Ortega said he did
not know the Centeno brothers and had no connection with INTERBANK. "I don't even have an
account there," he said. The Army entered the INTERBANK squabble, worried that the SIB might
intervene in the Banco de Finanzas. The Army has US$8 million in pension funds on deposit with
the BDF.
The daily La Prensa reported that Army chief Gen. Javier Carrion had a heated exchange with
Aleman on Aug. 16 about the supposed intervention of BDF. Carrion and other high-ranking officers
demanded clarification on the matter and forced Aleman to call a meeting of the Comision Nacional
de Seguridad to settle whether the BDF would be taken over.
After the meeting with Aleman, Carrion said he told the president he was concerned about the bank
scandal as "an element of national security." He said the country was going through political turmoil
and he could not discount the possibility of a national crisis. Any internal military crisis, such as
might occur with a threat to the Army's deposits in BDF, could interfere with its role in national
security.
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All of this sounded like veiled threats of a military coup, and Daniel Ortega said that SIB takeover of
BDF was imminent and a coup was possible. Aleman then went on radio to deny that Carrion had
threatened him with a coup if he did not leave BDF alone. Aleman said the overblown accounts of a
confrontation with the military were the work of Daniel Ortega.
Aleman blamed the INTERBANK scandal on him and on the "failed investments" of the
Sandinistas. World Bank wants to know plan for INTERBANK World Bank representative in
Nicaragua Ulrich Lachler told the daily El Nuevo Diario on Sept. 22 that the bank wanted to know
what the administration was going to do about financial instability. "What we need now is a
definition, an idea, a plan," he said. For inclusion in HIPC, the World Bank needs to know more
about Nicaragua than its indebtedness, he said.
Obviously referring to INTERBANK, he said the World Bank also needs to know about plans
for development of the private sector and about anything that could interrupt those plans.
Telecommunications still not privatized The World Bank is also "disappointed" with the
administration's failure to privatize the telecommunications company Empresa Nicaraguense de
Telecomunicacions (ENITEL), Lachler said.
The government failed in mid-September to sell a 40% share in ENITEL when the lone bidder,
France Telecom, offered US$63 million. The government had set the base price at US$79 million.
This was the third failed effort to bring private capital into ENITEL.
Lachler said one problem with the ENITEL privatization was that the government had set the
base price too high. There should be another attempt "as soon as possible," he said, noting that
there was at least one buyer ready with a good offer. Entry into HIPC is delayed, not canceled The
INTERBANK and ENITEL issues do not necessarily block Nicaragua's acceptance in HIPC.
Lachler said Nicaragua could advance in December to the final stage in the decision-making
process. He said the World Bank was satisfied with Nicaragua's progress in meeting its demands
for increased transparency and governability. He implied that some improvements had been made
in the Contraloria General de la Republica (CGR) since the reforms last year that forced former
Comptroller General Agustin Jarquin out of office (see NotiCen, 1999-12-23, 2000-01-27). However,
"there is much yet to be done," Lachler said.
BCN president Ramirez acknowledged that the INTERBANK crisis could complicate acceptance
in HIPC. Just before the crisis, the stage was set for a Sept. 14-15 meeting with the IMF to advance
Nicaragua to full acceptance in the program. But the BCN transfer of funds to bail out INTERBANK
lowered its reserves below levels acceptable to the IMF. To recoup its reserves, Ramirez said the
central bank would take measures to soak up excess liquidity in the banking system. [Sources:
Agence France-Presse, 08/08/00; Notimex, 08/08/00, 08/14/00, 08/16/00; El Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua),
08/08/00, 08/14/00, 08/15/00, 09/10/00, 09/23/00; La Prensa (Nicaragua), 08//08/00, 08/09/00, 08/12/00,
08/17/00, 08/22/00, 08/24/00, 08/27/00, 09/09/00, 09/27/00]
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